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BOOK REVIEWS
to his advanced age. To these I strongly recommend a prayerful
reading of Cicero's De Senectute-particularly chapters six and
seven with the quotation from the poet, Naevius.
E. M. Morgan*
THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION, by Owen J. Roberts. Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, 1951. Pp. 102. $2.00.
Whatever Justice Roberts has to say about the Supreme
Court is to be heard with attention, because of who he is and of
what he has been. The little volume here reviewed preserves
his Holmes Lectures for 1951.1
In our dual form of government it belongs to the Court to
pass upon "the alleged transgressions by one government upon
the authority of the other." In performing this function the
Court has been obliged "to announce propositions nowhere
expressly stated in the Constitution." 2 How wise has been its
work in this regard? That is the framework of the lectures.
Three fields are considered: taxation, regulation, and due process.
Marshall, as we now see it, got us off to a bad start in that
portion of McCulloch v. Maryland wherein he analyzed the
problem of federal immunity from state taxation. Thereafter
the history of intergovernmental immunities abounds in shifting
doctrine, and in exorbitant exemptions. "Most of the immuni-
ties so carefully built up on McCulloch v. Maryland have subse-
quently been swept away. In any practical view of the subject,
more should go," 3 is the conclusion. "My own view is that the
steady progress toward abolition of the reciprocal immunities
has been beneficial." 4
Chapter II deals with Conflicts of Police Power-a consid-
eration chiefly of commerce clause law, but also of the con-
gressional power to regulate by taxing and spending. In the
argument of the AAA case, United States v. Butler,5 Justice
Roberts recalls, "The government disavowed any support for
the statute under the commerce power." "The exaction was
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
1. A prefatory note records that Justice Holmes left a legacy for the
Harvard Law School, the income whereof is "devoted to paying the honora-
rium of a lecturer to be known as the Holmes Lecturer," an appointment
made "not oftener than once in three years."
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held not to be a true tax." 6 Here, as elsewhere in recording the
past of which he was a part, Justice Roberts is studiously imper-
sonal. He writes merely as one who has studied the reports. (He
does, however, cast numerous votes on issues arising after his
resignation.) His conclusion is that "The continual expansion
of federal power with consequent contraction of state powers
probably has been inevitable .... Looking back, it is difficult to
see how the Court could have resisted the popular urge for uni-
form standards throughout the country-for what in effect was
a unified economy." 7
Chapter III, The Fourteenth Amendment, deals with the
most active of the topics, and offers the most noteworthy com-
ments. Justice Roberts makes it clear that he would not join with
those who read the Amendment as incorporating the entirety
of the first eight Amendments.8 Nor does he take his stand with
those who accept as the logic of history that the due process
clause should be construed to safeguard those values found to
be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 9 Rather he em-
ploys the method of textual analysis: when the Fourteenth
Amendment was drafted, one clause from the federal bill of
rights was repeated and the others were ignored. Time and
again the Court has been urged to accord due process in the
Fourteenth Amendment a broader, more inclusive meaning than
in the Fifth, and often it has done so. Of Gitlow v. New York,10
wherein it was conceded that freedom of speech is to be included
within the "liberty" of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Rob-
erts says, "This decision was the most sweeping judicial exten-
sion of federal power over state action in the history of the
republic." 11
Proceeding by the method of strictly logical construction-
due process in the Fourteenth Amendment means what it does
in the Fifth, and necessarily excludes all other guaranties enu-
merated in the federal bill of rights-Justice Roberts comes to
the field of state criminal procedure, and finds much to criticize
in some of the holdings of the Court. But perhaps one may urge
that here wise judicial statesmanship calls for something more
than formal logic, and that the difficulty is inherent in the recon-
6. P. 47.
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9. See Cardozo, J., in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
10. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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ciliation of two high values--conceding to each state the respon-
sibility for working out the quality of its justice, while yet
assuring to the individual at least the essentials of fair treat-
ment, albeit not the particular guaranties enumerated in Amend-
ments One to Eight.
The reviewer closed the book with the thought that, inter-
esting and important as are all of the comments, the most sig-
nificant reflection is suggested rather than expressed in the text.
Every position is advanced accurately and defended with effec-
tive strokes-one recalls the author's strength when an advocate
at the bar. The present state of constitutional development is
marked, sometimes with a certain note of resignation but never
with the accent of despair. There have throughout our history
been patriots whose attachment to their own opinions was more
assured than their faith in the American nation. Justice Roberts
is not of their number. He is never one to spread alarm even
though at some points his views may not prevail. One knows
that, like the justice to whose memory the lectures did honor,
Justice Roberts has faith that the future may be greater than
the thought of even the wisest of patriots.
Charles Fairman*.
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND: A MAN AGAINST THE STATE, by Joel
Francis Paschal. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1951.
Pp. xii, 267. $4.00.
As the author, himself, recognizes, this is not conventional
biography. Indeed, it is scarcely biography at all. No clear-cut
picture of Mr. Justice Sutherland as an individual human being
emerges from these pages. Information with reference even to
the basic milestones of his career is sparingly offered. Mr. Paschal,
rather, has devoted himself to the study of the acquisition and
application by Sutherland of a theory of government. Within
these limitations-and perhaps, in part, because of them-the
author has produced a valuable, if not particularly engaging,
work.
It is Mr. Paschal's thesis that Sutherland, largely as a result
of his formal education under men like Cooley and Campbell at
the Michigan Law School and his early professional associations
at the bar, was profoundly influenced in his intellectual develop-
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